Whether a spouse may rely on his retirement as a change in circumstances to justify the modification of maintenance depends upon the circumstances of each individual case; relevant factors include his age, health, motives and timing of retirement, ability to pay maintenance after retirement, and the former spouse’s ability to provide for herself.
Where a change in the economic circumstances of one or both of the parties occurred between the remand and the new hearing, the wife’s proper recourse was to file a motion for modification pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, in which she could have presented any evidence of a substantial change in circumstances.
The standard for modification due to cohabitation was not met where former spouse’s roommate made only one contribution toward household expenses, the couple did not have a joint checking account and did not commingle funds in any manner, wife’s cohabitation with roommate did not affect her need for support, maintenance payments were not used to support roommate, couple seldom ate together, wife never did his laundry, they only occasionally slept in the same bedroom, and wife’s cohabitation with roommate was not on a resident, continuing conjugal basis.
The provision for the payment of alimony by husband as “one-half of his salary earned and received as a teacher or employee of the public schools of the City of Chicago, Illinois, as long as he is so employed” was held reasonably definite and certain.
Because subsection (b) of this section, before 1982 amendments, permitted parties to agree to maintenance that would be payable following the remarriage of the recipient, a settlement agreement that included a provision that maintenance payments were not modifiable did not warrant imposition of liability on an based on a breach of the standard of care owed to his client.
Under the reserved jurisdiction method, the court orders the employee spouse to pay an allocated portion of the pension fund to the former spouse, as it is disbursed, while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the decree; the payments are made by the employee spouse “if, as and when” the benefits become payable.
Husband failed to establish either duress or economic inequality to render marital property settlement agreement unconscionable.
In a divorce action where the plaintiff wife had no counsel of record when the cause was called for trial, the trial court’s ex parte decree of divorce entered upon defendant husband’s counterclaim was totally one-sided and unconscionable in that it awarded the defendant husband virtually all of the parties’ real and personal property besides granting him custody of the children who were then residing with the wife, and barred plaintiff wife from receiving alimony, such decree was vacated.
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Trust was created by appellee for his own benefit and was therefore invalid as a spendthrift trust; therefore prohibition of this section in reaching the trust for future child support payments did not apply so the trust was converted into a trust under 750 ILCS 5/503(g).
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Where respondent’s motivation at the time of transferring property title was to insulate himself and petitioner from difficulties in the event of the death of one or the other, the court’s decision to accept respondent’s testimony over that of petitioner was not an abuse of discretion.
One spouse may have a special equitable interest in property held in the other’s name, which interest may arise in many ways, and the court may award a share of the property representing such special interest in it.